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This paper develops a theoretical model of consumer demand for an energy conservation 
program that involves non-binding, self-set goals. We present evidence from a Northern Illinois 
goal-setting program, aimed at reducing residential electricity consumption, that is difficult to 
reconcile with standard preferences and is broadly consistent with a model of present-biased 
consumers with reference-dependent preferences. We find that the need for commitment is 
correlated with program adoption, higher pre-adoption consumption, and lower responsiveness to 
goals. Consumers choosing realistic goals persistently save substantially more, achieving savings 
of nearly 11%, than those choosing very low or unrealistically high goals..  
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1 Introduction
As the impact of climate change becomes increasingly stark, policymakers have renewed interest
in implementing interventions that can improve energy conservation. In light of general federal
inaction on implementing price-based interventions such as introducing a carbon tax or allowing
emissions trading in the foreseeable future, economists have begun to advocate the use of behav-
ioral “nudges,” which are non-price interventions grounded in psychology and behavioral eco-
nomics, as a partial solution to attenuate the impact of climate change (Allcott and Mullainathan,
2010). The hope is that such approaches can generate economically meaningful energy savings at
low cost, mirroring like interventions that have been documented in other areas of economics, such
as microfinance and retirement savings (Bertrand et al., 2010; Madrian and Shea, 2001).
In recent years, utilities and private enterprises have deployed energy efficiency and conser-
vation programs centered around behavioral nudges to millions of customers nationwide.1 They
typically provide consumers with information on energy saving actions and additional behavioral
nudges, such as social comparisons. Lately, many programs have also offered consumers the op-
tion to choose a personal energy conservation goal. However, the overall success of such programs
presents a puzzle, since there is no established economic framework that explains both individuals’
motivations to voluntarily participate in a program to save energy and the underlying mechanisms
that affect consumer behavior in the absence of material incentives.
This is the first paper to address both of these questions, by studying consumers’ decisions
to join an energy conservation program and their subsequent behavior upon joining. We present
theory and evidence on adoption and post-adoption behavior in the context of a multi-part energy
conservation program that included non-binding personal goal-setting, intended to reduce residen-
tial electricity use. We develop a model in which consumers sign up for the program because they
are aware of their dynamic inconsistency, and thus their tendency to overconsume electricity, and
respond to their self-set goals because they have reference-dependent preferences. We find sub-
stantial and persistent energy savings of 11% for informed customers who set realistic goals, and
approximately 4.4% on average for all customers. This paper is unique, in that it models and finds
empirical evidence that is broadly consistent with a precise behavioral mechanism that explains
both the decision to opt into the program as well subsequent behavior once enrolled.
This paper contributes to a number of different literatures in both energy and behavioral eco-
nomics. First, it contributes to the growing literature on the impact of behavioral, non-price inter-
ventions on energy consumption. Several studies suggest that utilities’ interventions that include
social comparisons to others’ usage or social norms can meaningfully affect consumers’ behav-
1One of the largest companies, OPower, works with over 80 utilities nationwide and claims over 2 Terawatt hours
of electricity saved as a result of its behavioral programs.
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ior (Allcott, 2011; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Costa and Kahn, 2010; Nolan et al., 2008; Bolsen
et al., 2013). Harding and Rapson (2014) show that a utility’s carbon offset program can lead to
consumption reductions of 2-3% when the social cost of pollution is emphasized. By exploiting
variation from the field, this study substantially enhances previous studies on the effects of per-
sonal goal-setting, which have found little effect of goals relative to energy-saving tips, due to
rather unclear designs (Wilhite and Ling, 1995; van Houwelingen and van Raaij, 1989). Second, it
contributes to the behavioral economics literature on non-binding goals. These have been explored
extensively by psychologists (Locke and Latham, 2002; Heath et al., 1999), but they have only re-
cently been studied by economists. Kőszegi and Rabin (2006; 2009) model reference dependence
by endogenizing reference point formation through rational expectations, which has been sup-
ported by experimental laboratory (Abeler et al., 2011; Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Sprenger, 2010)
and field (Fehr and Goette, 2007; Goette and Huffman, 2007) evidence. Hsiaw (2013) shows that
goals, in the form of targets, must be sufficiently realistic for reference-dependent agents to coun-
teract present-biasedness. This paper adds to the growing body of empirical evidence of reference-
dependent preferences (Camerer et al., 1997; Crawford and Meng, 2011; Pope and Schweitzer,
2011; Card and Dahl, 2011) in a new context, with goals that act as endogenous and measured
reference points. Moreover, to our knowledge, it is the first empirical study in which themotivated
use of reference dependence is demonstrated, to counteract present bias.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we describe the design and implementation of a multi-part
program in Northern Illinois that allows utility customers to choose energy savings goals. It also
provides them with information on how to implement energy-conserving actions to save energy,
and constant feedback on their performance.
Second, we introduce a theoretical model of sign-up and post-adoption usage in the program.
A consumer allocates consumption between an aggregate good and electricity, a good that yields
immediate benefits but a delayed (environmental) cost. If she is present-biased, she may sign up for
the program because she is aware that she will consume more electricity than she prefers ex ante. If
she has reference-dependent preferences, she curbs her consumption in response to a goal, which
acts as her reference point, because she derives utility directly from comparing her consumption
against this goal. Thus, the consumer’s present-biased preferences induce her to sign up for the
goal-setting program, while her reference-dependent preferences lead her to curb her consumption
in response to goals. We compare this behavioral model’s predictions against those of a standard
expected-utility model, and later discuss variants of them. Leading alternative mechanisms based
on standard preferences to explain the observed savings and sign-up patterns, such as information-
seeking and selection, are not consistent with the observed results.
Third, we explore consumers’ decisions to opt into the program and the choice of goals. We
find that the program is attractive to consumers who are present-biased and are aware of their
3
need for commitment to attenuate overconsumption. The choice of goals reveals substantial het-
erogeneity in consumers. While 73% of consumers choose realistic or optimistic goals, 15% of
consumers choose the minimum goal possible. About 12% of consumers choose impossibly high
goals. Overall, average savings over the year post-adoption are approximately 4.4%, but up to 8%
savings are achieved in the first few months of the program. For well-calibrated consumers who
choose realistic goals, we find substantial and persistent savings of nearly 11%, but no savings
among those who set very low or unrealistically high goals. While it is not possible to derive a
causal claim regarding the impact of goal setting on savings in the context of a non-experimental
program implementation, our analysis shows that households who are aware of their present bias
and desire to save electricity will select into the program and tend to save in accordance with their
chosen goals when such goals are realistic.
We conclude by discussing leading alternative mechanisms, such as information seeking and
selection, which are difficult to reconcile with our findings.
2 CUB Energy Saver Program
We now describe a concrete example of a behavioral program, where the primary user experience
was focused on selecting and acting on an individually chosen energy conservation goal. We
collected data from a pilot program which was designed by Efficiency 2.0 (recently acquired by
C3), a provider of energy efficiency programs to utilities, and was funded by the Citizens Utility
Board (CUB) of Illinois.2 The program was restricted to residential users, all of whom were
customers of ComEd, a large utility. It was advertised to a limited subset of ComEd customers
through direct mail and community events. As a result, program adoption is heavily concentrated
in the Chicago Metropolitan Area. We restrict our analysis to adopters during the first year of the
program, starting with its introduction in June 2010, a period over which program implementation
remained constant. The CUB Energy Saver program involves a website designed by C3, which
can be accessed from the main CUB webpage. It provides an integrated user experience, separate
from the utility website, with a focus on detailed information coupled with behavioral incentives.
Signing up for the program involves successfully completing three steps. First, a user must fill
out basic contact information. Second, the user must provide utility account information, which
allows the program to access past and future billing information. Third, the user is offered a menu
of energy savings options corresponding to roughly 5%, 10% and 15% annual electricity savings,
which are labeled as “No Cost,” “Low Cost” and “Home Investment” plans, reflecting the extent
2CUB was set up in 1983 by the Illinois General Assembly as a nonprofit, nonpartisan organisation designed to
represent the interests of residential utility consumers.
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to which a household may need to make further purchases (e.g. energy efficient appliances) to
save energy. Each savings plan comes with a concrete list of energy savings recommendations,
all of which the user can seebeforeselecting a goal.3 Users can add additional energy savings
actions from a long list of possible actions, effectively selecting a goal on a continuous savings
range. Each action can be customized for a household’s specific technology base (for example, by
entering information on exactly how many lightbulbs will be replaced with CFLs and the number
of hours they will be used per day), providing a more accurate savings estimate.
Once a consumer has signed up for the website, she can easily monitor her monthly consump-
tion, since the website obtains and displays all past monthly electricity bills directly from the utility.
On average consumers log in to the website once every 2-3 months but a significant fraction of the
consumers appears to be very involved, logging in at least once a month. The website also re-
wards customers with “points” computed by an algorithm that adjusts energy use for weather and
seasonality. This algorithm is not available to the user, and points arenot based on consumption
relative to self-set goals. These points can then be redeemed for coupons offering discounts at local
retail establishments. The point system was implemented by the company to promote engagement
with the website, and our analysis indicates that these points are only weakly correlated to actual
savings. Point redemption is also extremely low and a survey indicates that points are not a major
incentive for program adoption. Thus, we believe that the unaltered billing data is the most useful
information available to households in order to monitor their consumption goals.
3 Theoretical Framework
We model a consumer’s enrollment decision and her subsequent behavior as a two-stage optimiza-
tion problem. In the first stage, she decides whether or not to sign up for the program. In the second
stage, she chooses her monthly level of electricity consumption. If she has not signed up, then she
receives no goal and consumes electricity accordingly. If she has signed up, then she receives a
goal, in the form of a consumption target, and consumes electricity accordingly. Derivations and
proofs are collected in the Appendix.
The model has four key features: (1) the consumption problem is a constrained allocation de-
cision between electricity and an aggregate good, (2) electricity is a good that yields immediate
benefits and delayed costs, (3) the consumer is present-biased, so she tends to overconsume elec-
tricity in the absence of intervention, and (4) the consumer has reference-dependent preferences, so
a goal influences her behavior by serving as a reference point. The first two assumptions describe
the consumer’s basic problem and the key properties of electricity, in contrast to the aggregate
3The information provided is, to some extent, customized to each individual user, based on rough estimates derived
from a statistical model of household energy consumption and appliance saturation.
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good. Given billing structures, consumers derive immediate utility from electricity usage, but do
not pay for it until the end of the month. Thus, electricity use is much like credit card borrowing,
with which present bias has been correlated (Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Shui and Ausubel, 2005).4
An alternative, broader interpretation is that while the benefits of consumption are enjoyed in the
present, the nontrivial negative consequences of current consumption will not be felt until the next
generation(s) – extreme weather due to climate change, sufficiently polluted air and water – about
which the consumer cares to some degree for selfish or altruistic reasons.5 In conjunction with
these two features, the third assumption generates demand for a mechanism to attenuate future con-
sumption. The fourth assumption explains how goal provision can serve as such a mechanism, by
providing the consumer with an incentive to consume less electricity. Note that present-biasedness
is not necessary to describe the consumer’s behavior in response to goals once she has signed up
for the program. Rather, present-biasedness is necessary to explain why the consumer would sign
up for the program in the first place—a time-consistent consumer would be able to consume less
electricity without the aid of the program if that were optimal. In an alternative model in which a
consumer has rationally decided not to reduce energy use (for example, if she finds it too costly to
invest in a durable good that reduces energy use), revealed preferences imply that she would not
select a intervention to change her behavior, especially if it is costly to sign up. Thus, the model is
novel in that it explains bothowgoal-setting affects behavior through reference dependence, and
whyconsumers demand such an intervention due to present bias.6
We also consider an alternative model in which the consumer isneither reference-dependent
nor present-biased, and is driven entirely by material benefits. As a standard expected-utility max-
imizer, she signs up for the program to earn reward points (and perhaps to curb consumption);
likewise, her post-adoption behavior is incentivized by reward points, not reference-dependent
preferences. Because the expected utility model is a special case of the first model, we develop the
former and then contrast their predictions. After comparing the results to these two models, we
discuss and rule out other variants of expected utility, including information-seeking and selection.
The Consumer’s Problem.In the first stage, denoted period 0, the consumer decides whether or
not to sign up for the goal-setting program. If she signs up, she incurs a one-time sign-up cost
(ε ≥ 0) in period 0. We can think of this cost as the nuisance of filling out forms to sign up and
link their billing records to the program, net of the sign-up bonus. She also sets her goalr for
4And if a consumer pays the electricity bill with a credit card, the cost of usage is delayed even further exactly by
such borrowing.
5Here, “environmental concern” can be interpreted as an individual’s subjective beliefs about the discounted envi-
ronmental costs from electricity usage,δc(x).
6Hsiaw (2013) considers the interaction of present bias and reference dependence in an optimal stopping prob-
lem. Here, we model energy consumption as an intertemporal problem, which leads to dynamic inconsistency in the
presence of present bias.
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consumption in the next period, against which she will compare her actual consumption in the
second stage.
In the second stage, denoted period 1, the consumer decides how much of her incomem t
allocate between consumption of an aggregate goody, which has a per-unit price normalized to
1, and consumption of electricityx, which has a per-unit pricep. At the end of period 1, she
derives utility from consumingx andy and from comparing her consumptionx to her goalr. The
consumer’s benefits from consumption of electricity and the aggregate good are accrued in period
1 and are described byu(x,y), whereux > 0, uy > 0, anduxx < 0, uyy < 0.
Consumption of electricity also leads to a future cost to the consumer,c(x). For simplicity, we
assume that this future cost is incurred in the period after consumption (i.e., period 2), whereδ is
the consumer’s discount factor. We assume that the marginal cost of each additional unit is positive
and weakly increasing in electricity consumption:c(0) = 0, c′(x) > 0 andc′′(x) ≥ 0. In contrast,
there is no future cost associated with consumption of the aggregate goody. Thus, electricity is a
good whose consumption yields immediate benefits and delayed costs.
Why might a consumer want to curb her electricity use? If she is aware that she has a self-
control problem and tends to overconsume electricity, she may seek a device to counteract this
tendency. The consumer has quasi-hyperbolic time preferences, so for allt,





where 0< β ≤ 1 and 0< δ ≤ 1 (Phelps and Pollack, 1968; Laibson, 1997). Thus, the consumer’s
period-1 discounted utility from consuming electricity and the aggregate good isu(x,y)−βδc(x).
However, her ex-ante, period-0 discounted utility is equivalent to that of an exponential discounter,
with β = 1. Thus, whenβ < 1, the consumer suffers from a time-consistency problem: she always
prefers to consume more electricity in the present, but prefers that she consume less in the future.
How can a goal counteract this time-consistency problem? We assume that the consumer has
additively separable, reference-dependent preferences. In addition to deriving utility from absolute
consumption, she derives comparison utility from comparing her electricity consumption against
a reference pointr, which is the consumption goal or target that she faces under the goal-setting
program, at the end of period 1. The goal is set during period 0, so it is taken as given and cannot
be changed by the consumer at the time she makes the allocation decision in period 1.7 If she does
not sign up for the goal-setting program, she does not have a goal against which to evaluate herself
in period 1. There is extensive evidence that without a well-defined basis against which to make a
7The qualitative results would be weakened but still hold if the consumer were allowed to adjust his goal in the
second stage, as long as the original goal from the first stage is somewhat “sticky.” Hsiaw (2013) explores this
possibility in the context of optimal stopping, but the qualitative results apply here.
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comparison, vague goals have no effect on motivation and effort (Latham and Locke, 1991; Mento
et al., 1992). In this case, we assume that her comparison utility equals zero.
Let the consumer’s comparison utility be described by the functionf (r − x). The consumer
derives no comparison utility from meeting her goal exactly, since she experiences neither a gain
or a loss (f (0) = 0). She experiences positive comparison utility (i.e., a gain) when she consumes
less electricity than her goal (f r − x) > 0 if r > x). Likewise, she experiences a loss when she
consumes more than her goal (f (r−x) < 0 if r < x). The functionf is strictly increasing in the gap
between the goal and consumption (f ′(r −x) > 0 ∀x). Consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979), she exhibits diminishing sensitivity to both gains and losses (f ′′(r −x) < 0 if
r > x and f ′′(r −x) > 0 if r < x).
The consumer derives utilityg(x0− x) from reward points. In contrast to comparison utility,
points are awarded by the program when the consumer consumes less electricity relative tol st
year’s consumption in the corresponding period, denotedx0, rather than the self-set goalr. Clearly,
past consumption must be taken as given by the consumer and cannot be changed in the second
stage, and she derives no utility from having no points (g(0) = 0). The number of awarded points
increases with the amount of electricity saved relative tox0, but points are not subtracted when the
consumer consumesmoreelectricity than she did in the corresponding period last year (g(x0−x) >
0 if x0 > x, g(x0−x) = 0 if x0 ≤ x). Receiving more points yields more, but diminishing marginal,
utility (g′(x0−x) > 0 andg′′(x0−x) < 0 if x0 > x, andg′(x0−x) = g′′(x0−x) = 0 if x≤ x).
Thus, the consumer’s problem in period 1 is
max
x,y
u(x,y)+1signup[ f (r −x)+g(x0−x)]−βδc(x) subject tom≥ px+y, (3.2)
where 1signup= 1 if the consumer has signed up for the program and is zero otherwise. When
deciding whether to sign up for the program in period 0, she takes into account her consumption
behavior in response to the goal and the reward points she would earn.8
Characterizing Consumer Behavior. Let (x∗,y∗) be the consumer’s consumption if she signs
up for the program. Whenβ < 1, the consumer is present-biased, undervaluing the future costs
of electricity consumption relative to its immediate benefits. This leads her to consume more
electricity than she prefers from an ex-ante perspective, when she would like to consume as though
β = 1. The presence of a consumption goalr counteracts this tendency, because she is motivated
to increase comparison utility by consuming less. When the goal is achievable (r ≥ x), a more
ambitious goal motivates her to consume less due to diminishing sensitivity to gains - the marginal
8In the Appendix, we account for period-1 costs of implementing goals in the model, for which qualitative results
are unchanged.
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gain from decreasing consumption is higher asr decreases in the gains region. But, because the
consumer exhibits diminishing sensitivity to losses, a goal that is excessively ambitious (r < x)
becomeslesseffective as it becomes even more ambitious - the marginal gain from decreasing
consumption is lower asr decreases in the loss region. As long as the consumer cares about future
utility (β > 0), she will decrease electricity usage as its discounted costs increase.
Proposition 1 Given a consumption goal r, the consumer’s electricity usage upon sign-up has the
following properties:
1. Her usage increases with present-biasedness:∂x
∗
∂β < 0.
2. When her consumption is lower than her goal, her usage decreases as her consumption goal
decreases:∂x
∗
∂r > 0 when r≥ x
∗. When her consumption is higher than her goal, her usage
increases as her consumption goal decreases:∂x
∗
∂r < 0 when r< x
∗.
3. Her usage decreases as the discounted environment cost increases:∂x
∗
∂δ < 0 whenβ > 0.
In period 0, the consumer decides whether to sign up for the program, and sets a goal for the
second stage if she does so. If she signs up, she incurs a one-time sign-up cost, denotedε ≥ 0.
Thus, the sign-up decision has an initial fixed cost (ε), and a delayed period-1 benefit that arises
from consuming a level of electricity closer to the customer’s ex-ante optimum.
At this point, the manner in which the goal is determined is crucial for the sign-up decision
and characterizing subsequent behavior. We assume that the selected goal must be fully consistent
with the consumer’s beliefs about the outcome she will achieve. That is, she must set a goal that
she believes she will actually meet, satisfying rational expectations. Under the interpretation that
the the goal acts as a reference point against which the consumer compares her consumption, this
assumption is consistent with psychological findings, as well as prevailing theoretical work on
reference-dependent preferences. Based on lab and field experiments, Latham and Locke (1991)
conclude that goal choice is an integration of what one wants and what one believes is possible,
suggesting that goals are realistic. In this vein, Kőszegi and Rabin (2006; 2009) assume that when
making decisions and plans, reference-dependent individuals endogenously form reference points
that must satisfy rational expectations.
The consumer’s sign-up decision and subsequent goal choice also depend on her beliefs about
future behavior, particularly the degree to which she is aware of her time inconsistency. To capture
the full spectrum of beliefs, we use O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (2001) model of partial naivete, in
which the consumer may be aware of her time-inconsistency but may underestimate its magnitude.
The concept of partial naivete generalizes the polar cases of naive and sophistication (O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999), and allows us to explore the effect of belief heterogeneity on observed behavior
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in the actual program.9 Let β̂ be her period-0 belief about parameterβ, with which she actually
makes the consumption decision in period 1. In period 0, she evaluates utility according to (the
true) β, but shebelievesthat in the future, she will make decisions based onβ̂, whereβ̂ ∈ [β,1].
Whenβ̂ = β = 1, the consumer is a standard exponential discounter, and is thus time-consistent.
When β̂ = β < 1, the consumer is sophisticated, fully aware of her time inconsistency. When
β < β̂ = 1, the consumer is naive, completely unaware of her time inconsistency and extremely
optimistic about her ability to implement ex-ante plans.
When the goal is determined by expectations, the consumerbelievesthat she will choose
(x∗,y∗) according toβ̂ rather thanβ. Since her goal matches these expectations, thenr = x∗(β̂).
Let V(x∗(β̂),y∗(β̂)|r = x∗(β̂)) be her perceived indirect utility from signing up for the program,
given goalr = x∗(β̂). Whenr = x∗(β̂), the consumer expects to receive zero comparison utility
from meeting her goal. LetV(x̃(β̂), ỹ(β̂)) be her perceived indirect utility from not signing up,
where(x̃, ỹ) is her consumption if she does not sign up:
V(x∗(β̂),y∗(β̂)|r = x∗(β̂)) = u(x∗(β̂),y∗(β̂))+g(x0−x∗(β̂))−δc(x∗(β̂)) (3.3)
V(x̃(β̂), ỹ(β̂)) = u(x̃(β̂), ỹ(β̂))−δc(x̃(β̂)). (3.4)
When she is not in the goal-setting program, she has no additional motivation to consume less
electricity, so ˜x(β̂) ≥ x∗(β̂). Based on her beliefs, the consumer signs up for the program if its
discounted net benefits outweigh its sign-up cost.
In the absence of reward points, a consumer who believes she will not overconsume in the
future (̂β = 1) would not sign up for the program even ifε = 0, since she believes that goals
would distort optimal behavior. Thus, time-consistent and naive consumers will only sign up if
reward points are sufficiently attractive. On the other hand, a consumer with a low (true)β is less
inclined to sign up, since she does not value the future benefits from sign-up sufficiently relative
to the immediate sign-up cost. Thus, consumers who recognize their need for self-control are
more inclined to sign up for the goal-setting program (β̂ < 1). If reward points are not sufficiently
attractive for time-consistent and naive consumers to sign up, they are certainly not sufficient to
induce sign-up by sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, who anticipate earning fewer rewards due
to the tendency to overconsume. In this case, program sign-up is driven by the desire to curb
overconsumption due to present-biasedness.
Proposition 2 When goals are determined by expectations, time-consistent (β = β̂ = 1) and naive
(β < β̂ = 1) consumers only sign up for the goal-setting program if reward points are sufficiently
attractive. Otherwise, a consumer must recognize her own time inconsistency to sign up for the
9Ali (2011) derives the conditions under which partial naivete can arise when an individual can learn about the
severity of her self-control problem through experimentation.
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program (̂β < 1).
When goals are determined by expectations, those who sign up and have more optimistic beliefs
about their self-control (i.e., higherβ̂) will set more ambitious consumption goals (i.e., lowerr),
because they expect to achieve them. But those who are partially naive (β < β̂) will fall short of
them, since they are more present-biased than they had believed.10
Proposition 3 When goals are determined by expectations, consumers who have signed up for the
goal-setting program will either meet their goals (when fully sophisticated) or fall short of them
(when partially naive).
Freely Chosen Goals.We now consider the implications of an alternative model, where the con-
sumer is an expected utility (EU) maximizer, neither reference-dependent nor present-biased. This
is equivalent to assuming thatβ̂ = β = 1 and thatf (r − x) = 0 for all x. The key difference be-
tween the standard EU maximizer and the reference-dependent consumer is that after sign-up, the
former is not affected by the self-set goal at all. However, her behavioris affected by the presence
of reward points, which affect her material outcome. She will be motivated by reward points to
consume less electricity if they are negatively correlated with consumption.
Because the self-set goal (r) is completely divorced from the consumer’s material payoff, her
goal choice is completely irrelevant to her utility. Thus, there should be no correlation between
her goal choice,r, and actual consumption. Here, the consumer has no self-control problem to
mitigate, so she will sign up only if earning reward points outweighs their distortionary effect of
reducing her consumption.
Proposition 4 When the consumer is not reference-dependent, the selected goal is unrelated to
actual consumption. Moreover, she will certainly consume less electricity after signing up for the
program if she earns reward points from doing so.
Thus, the two models of consumer preferences offer very different predictions about program
sign-up and subsequent goal selection. When the consumer is reference-dependent and present-
biased, she will only sign up if she desires commitment, and she will set realistic or overly-
optimistic goals relative to her actual consumption. When the consumer is a standard EU max-
imizer, she will sign up purely to earn reward points. Because the accumulation of reward points
is unrelated to the self-selected goal, her goal choice should be unrelated to actual consumption.
10The addition of uncertainty does not change the qualitative prediction when consumers have correct expectations
about this uncertainty. Sophisticates will meet their goals on average, and those who are partially naive will fall short
of their goals on average.
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4 Model Evaluation
We conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis of the program data using a number of different
econometric approaches.
Data. To conduct our empirical analysis, we combine data from various sources. C3 collects
detailed information on program participants, including the time of sign-up and monthly electricity
bills before and after adoption. For each consumer, we know the precise billing cycle, which
typically spans days in two calendar months. We re-normalize each bill to correspond to a calendar
month by assuming uniform consumption during the month. Thus, the estimated monthly bill for
each consumer is constructed as the sum of the average daily consumption from two different bills.
While this introduces some inevitable measurement error, it is preferable to ignoring the different
billing cycles. We thus have an (unbalanced) panel dataset from January 2009 to December 2011.
Unfortunately, since the program was not run by the local utility ComEd, we do not have
access to the full database of households that would have been eligible for the program. Since
we wish to understand the decision to opt into the program in addition to the effect of adoption
on consumers, we construct a “control” group of customers who could have opted in but did not.
While it is impossible to determine exactly who was exposed to the varied marketing campaigns
surrounding this program, we can look instead at customers who would have been eligible to opt
in but did not, whatever the reason may be. To do so, we purchased voter registration files for
the state of Illinois from a third party provider. We selected a random stratified sample of Illinois
residents to reflect the proportion of non-adopters in the zip codes where adopters reside. Both
groups of households were then linked to individual-level demographics from another third party
provider. Some variables, such as age and income, are estimated at the household level. We
do not know the precise age of the household head, but only whether someone of a certain age
resides in the household. Consequently, households where more than one family reside together
will appear twice in each respective age group. In addition to basic demographic information such
as age, household income, education, presence of children and household size, we also acquired
additional lifestyle information, which the third party provider obtains from past subscriptions or
purchasing behavior.
To identify consumers who are motivated by environmental concerns, we acquired two vari-
ables: environmental issuesand green living, which have been shown by Harding and Rapson
(2014) to correlate with adoption into a carbon offsetting program in California.Environmental
issuesmeasures whether a household has expressed interest in environmental or wildlife issues
through magazine subscriptions and/or mail response.Gr en livingis a variable which aims to
identify households that are living environmentally friendly, by buying green household cleaning
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products, eating organic foods, donating funds to environmental causes, or driving hybrids. These
variables were constructed without reference to the program analyzed.
We also acquired lifestyle variables that are potential indicators of self-control problems, i.e.
difficulty behaving in a manner consistent with ex ante plans. Thus, we know whether the person
signing up for the program is a smoker or regularly engages in lottery and casino gaming. We also
know whether the consumer is or has recently made purchases of dieting and weight loss products
or participates in weight loss programs. We captured two additional variables that may also be
related to self-control when interpreted as conditional on income. One is a measure of loan-to-
value ratio for the household, a commonly used measure of risk based on the ratio of the current
mortgage relative to market values. A ratio of 80% or above typically identifies a risky borrower,
so a high loan-to-value ratio, conditional on income, may indicate weaker self-control. The other
financial variable we capture is whether or not the consumer has one or more retail store lines
of credit (e.g. Old Navy), which does not include bank-issued credit cards. These variables are
used extensively in consumer marketing and are associated with various measures of behavioral
biases. For example, Meier and Sprenger (2010) show that experimentally measured present bias
is highly correlated with credit card borrowing, while Ikeda et al. (2010) find that procrastination
is positively correlated with body mass index.
Our sample consists of 2,487 households who signed up during the first year of the program
and for which we have billing and demographic information. We also have information on 9,964
households derived from the random stratified sample of households in Illinois based on available
voter registrations.11 Table 1 shows the summary statistics for our data. Adopters are likely to be
younger and more educated. They are much more likely to have gone to graduate school and live in
smaller households. Adopters are also more likely to express environmental interest and to be en-
gaged in environmentally friendly actions. Turning to our potential indicators of self-control prob-
lems, dieters are more likely to participate in the program, while smokers are less likely (though
not statistically significant). Households are comparable in terms of gambling. Households with
one or more credit lines are, however, less likely to participate, while households with a high loan
to value ratio are more likely to sign up.12
Goal Choice. Goals are implicitly set by choosing a set of actions, each implying a certain level
of electricity savings, which may vary depending on property characteristics. We quantify a con-
sumer’s selected goal levels as the implied electricity savings from implementing the chosen ac-
tions over the next year as a fraction of the total electricity usage in the 12 months prior to adoption.
11We obtained information on 10,000 households chosen at random from the zip codes where adoption occurred,
but 36 households were already registered for the program.
12Note that these statements are based purely on the summary statistics and do not consider the correlations between
these different demographics as captured by our multivariate analysis.
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Although users are actively encouraged to choose a goal of 5%, 10% or 15%, the actual distribution
of chosen goals is continuous. Approximately 15% of the consumers choose a 0% savings goal
(i.e. they choose to select no action which they plan to implement). Approximately 32% of the
consumers choose a goal greater than 0% but less than 15%. We consider goals in this range, which
the program deems achievable to consumers explicitly, to be “realistic.” About 41% choose savings
goals in the range 15% to 50%, which we consider to be over-optimistic. In a recent consulting
report, McKinsey (2009) suggests that savings of about 23% may be achievable. Meier (2009)
reports that following an avalanche destroying the power transmission lines in the city of Juneau,
Alaska, residents reduced energy use and improved energy efficiency by as much as 30% in the
following 6 weeks. This is a fairly extreme case of what consumers can achieve under dire circum-
stances. Thus, goals in this range entail significant lifestyle changes and are rather over-optimistic
for most consumers. The remaining 12% of consumers choose undoubtedly unreasonable goals
that imply savings in excess of 50% of their previous year’s consumption.
Consumers have a strong propensity to overcommit by selecting too many goals. Most con-
sumers go well beyond the three to five actions recommended on the website. The mean consumer
chooses 10 actions, and 95% of consumers choose fewer than 25 actions. The mean consumer
who chooses savings in excess of 50% commits to over 20 actions. Consumers tend to prefer op-
tions which do not require substantial financial investment, instead choosing options which rely on
behavioral change.13 Low-cost or no-cost actions alone do not fully explain the degree of over-
confidence observed. The median cost of implementing the savings actions is $60, reflecting the
large selection of low-cost actions, while the mean cost is just below $1,500, indicating that some
consumers commit to very expensive investment choices. In particular, consumers with savings
commitments in excess of 50% of their past savings commit to mean investments of around $3000.
Pre-adoption consumption.Our model predicts that before enrolling in the program, present-
biased consumers are likely to consume more electricity than consumers who are not present-
biased. In model A of Table 2, we regress monthly consumption before adoption on the household
characteristics. The estimates suggest that variables associated with present-biasedness tend to
have a (weak) positive effect on pre-adoption usage, indicating that present-biased consumers may
in fact tend to consume more electricity. Specifically, a high loan-to -value ratio is significantly
related to higher pre-adoption consumption; the other indicators of present bias are positively but
not significantly related. Statistically, mean consumption is strongly driven by demographic fac-
13The most popular actions chosen are: Install CFLs in your lighting fixtures; Close your blinds during summer
days; Wash only full loads of dishes; Use more natural lighting; Unplug your coffee maker when you’re done brewing;
Clean the lint trap in your dryer before every load; Use a drying rack to dry your clothes; Turn up the temperature of
your thermostat during the summer; Use a microwave oven instead of your oven for cooking; Hand clean your oven
instead of using the auto clean.
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tors such as household size and income.
Program adoption. A household is considered an adopter if she successfully “linked” her utility
account to the CUB website. We assume that the households we observe from the voter registration
lists had the opportunity to opt-in but did not. Thus, a natural way to investigate the characteristics
of the adopters is to conduct a logit analysis on the decision to opt-in as function of the observable
demographics, corresponding to a simple linear random utility choice model. Note that we are
dealing with a non-random sample, since the data was constructed conditional on adoption status,
a sampling framework that is usually referred to as “choice based sampling” or “retrospective sam-
pling,” since it uses the ex-post outcomes as part of the sampling frame. It is well-known in this
setting that estimation by maximum likelihood leads to inconsistent parameter estimates (Manski
and Lerman, 1977). While several approaches are available to address this issue14, they typically
require additional quantities that are not observed in the sample. An interesting feature of the logis-
tic models is that consistent estimates of the slope coefficients and corresponding standard errors
can be obtained even in the presence of choice-based sampling (Prentice and Pyke, 1979; Scott
and Wild, 1986), while only the estimated intercept coefficient is inconsistently estimated. This
imposes some restrictions, as it prevents us from computing marginal effects without imposing out
of sample priors on these unobserved parameters.
The estimated coefficients are displayed in model B of Table 2. Column 2 shows that smaller,
more educated households who are concerned for the environment are more likely to opt in. We
find that smoking is a significant negative predictor of adoption, while dieting is a significant driver
of adoption, suggesting that recognition of present bias is relevant for sign-up as predicted by the
behavioral model. Dieters are more likely to be aware of time inconsistency and the need for
commitment, since they seek additional intervention to curb caloric intake. Smoking in itself does
not reliably predict the need for commitment, since smokers can include smokers who don’t want
to quit.15 A high loan-to-value ratio is a positive and significant predictor of adoption, while having
one or more store credit lines is a negative predictor. Both groups are likely to be present-biased,
but given the recent collapse in the housing market and its severity, it is probable that the former
is very much aware of its time inconsistency. Moreover, store credit lines alone are an incomplete
measure of credit card borrowing and we do not have information on total credit card borrowing.
We can investigate the commitment behavior of households which have signed up for the pro-
gram further by investigating their goal level and the number of actions to which they commit.
Model C estimates an ordered logit for the level of commitment, while Model D estimates a neg-
14See Amemiya (1985) for a thorough review of this problem and associated classical solutions.
15Khwaja et al. (2007) find that smoking is not significantly correlated with measures of hyperbolic discounting,
though it is related to more general measures of impulsivity.
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ative binomial model for the number of actions. In order to estimate Model C we define the goal
level of each household as an ordered choice corresponding to a fraction of committed savings
to past usage of 0%, 0%-15%, 15%-50%, or 50%+. Both models focus on the decision of the
households to commit to a certain level of savings, after they have successfully signed up for the
program. As a result both models are estimated on the sample of 2,487 adopters.
Model C of Table 2 shows that smaller and less wealthier households are more likely to over-
commit. We do not find a clear relationship between the commitment level and the included
lifestyle variables. Model D of Table 2 attempts to explain the number of chosen actions that
the consumers commit to. Education, especially a graduate degree, acts as a moderating force
on the number of actions committed to by a consumer. Green living predicts a higher number of
committed actions, which may indicate that some consumers may select actions they have already
done. Wealthier households choose a higher number of actions, reflecting their greater savings
opportunities. Interestingly, dieting indicates a propensity to set overly optimistic goals, in the
number of actions. That they tend to be over-optimistic may be not surprising, in light of the fact
that dieting itself is often an unsuccessful exercise. Since dieters are a group who exhibit a demand
for commitment, their behavior is consistent with the behavioral model’s prediction that those who
recognize their self-control problem and their reference-dependence will set goals to counteract
overconsumption. The EU model again predicts no systematic relationship between indicators of
demand for self-control and adoption or goal choice.
Measuring post-adoption savings.We now present evidence that households who are aware of
their present bias and have well-calibrated expectations tend to achieve their goals on average.
Note that in the context of a large-scale real world program implementation we lack the ability to
perfectly account for all selection factors.16 Thus, we do not claim that any households exposed
to such a program would achieve post-adoption savings. Rather, we have shown that households
who want to save energy and think they will respond to goals are signing up for the program and
using the program as a mechanism to change their behavior and save electricity. Furthermore, we
will show that some households do not have well-calibrated goals, and thus not all households will
benefit from the program post-adoption.
In order to measure post-adoption savings we use a series of common econometric strategies
from the labor economics literature. In particular, we use the variation in the timing of adoption
in a difference-in-differences framework to measure the effect of adoption into the program on
subsequent use, while also controlling for individual and time effects (Reber, 2005; Hoynes and
16In order to evaluate a stronger causal claim we would have required a randomized control trial where some
households who sign up for the program are then denied service. In general such an approach is infeasible in the
context of a heavily regulated industry, where considerations of customer equity are very important to firms and
regulators alike.
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Schanzenbach, 2009, 2012). This strategy assumes that conditional on time invariant household
characteristics, the timing of adoption into the program is random and that we can compare the
consumption of households who opt into the program with the consumption of households who
have not yet opted in, but will do so later on.
We also conduct three additional robustness checks to validate the robustness of our approach
to measuring post-adoption savings. First, we conduct a duration analysis of the timing of adop-
tion using a Han and Hausman (1990) model with flexible baseline hazard and Gamma distributed
unobserved heterogeneity, which reveals that while the shared baseline hazard is statistically sig-
nificant, neither the observed covariates nor the unobserved heterogeneity can explain the timing
of adoption (detailed results are available from the authors). This indicates that the timing of adop-
tion depends solely on marketing exposure and does not relate to variables which may affect the
trending behavior post-adoption. Second, our statistical model does not reveal the presence of any
pre-existing savings trends before adoption and the savings trends after adoption show a consis-
tent pattern across participants. Since each participant has a different start date, it is extremely
implausible that the households were exposed to some other unobserved factors (e.g. community
meetings), which happened to be temporally aligned with the timing of adoption into the program,
and which were also aimed at inducing energy efficiency. Third, we show that, to the extent that
unobservable factors are correlated with observable covariates, these cannot be explaining our sav-
ings by introducing a propensity score matching between individuals signing up for the program at
different points in time using the method of Sianesi (2004). This adjusts for potential demographic
differences between individuals signing up at different points in time and provides strong evidence
of the robustness of our estimates.
To estimate average individual level savings while being as flexible as possible in terms of the





δkDkit +αt + γi + εit (4.5)
whereDkit are a set of indicator variables set equal to one if, in calendar montht, householdi
is k months away from its enrollment month in the CUB program. The model also accounts for
individual effectsγi and month-year effectsαt . The underlying assumption is that, conditional on
time-invariant household characteristics and aggregate month-specific shocks, all households that
arek months away from enrolling in the program are identical (in expectation). The specification
implicitly models the response as a piecewise linear function of relative time to adoption, with no
restrictions on the variation or pattern of the response over time. This provides a test of our main
assumption, as we should not observe statistically significant trends pre-adoption.
We restrict the event study window such thatk∈ [m,m], and normalize the coefficient of event
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month prior to adoption to zero.17 We choose 12 months pre-adoption and 18 months post-adoption
as the cut-off points for our event window. The relatively long post-adoption window allows us
to evaluate the long run persistence of any observed behavioral change, but it prevents us from
constructing a balanced panel, since data after December 2011 is not available to us. We thus
remain cautious in our interpretation of the estimation results for the later months, since they may
also reflect compositional changes resulting from a diminishing sample size and which will be
reflected by increasing confidence bounds.
In Figure 1, we present the estimated coefficients on the indicator variables in event time.
Before adoption, we see no statistically significant trends. Post adoption, however, the average es-
timated savings are 4.4%. Households realize very impressive saving of close to 8% by the second
month after sign-up, but over the next six months, average savings diminish and become statis-
tically indistinguishable from zero. Notice, however, that the standard errors also increase over
time as the sample diminishes with the length of the event window. We can use propensity score
matching across time periods to adjust the savings estimate for biases arising from the different
selection into the program over time (Sianesi, 2004). The precise technical details of the matching
algorithm are discussed in the Appendix. In Table 3 we report savings estimated from using both
demographic variables and pre-adoption usage in two nearest-neighbor matching procedures. We
find that estimated savings range from 2.9% to 4.4% depending on the matching set.
Goal level and savings.We estimate the effect of adoption on savings separately in relation to
the chosen goals. In Figure 2 we report the estimated mean savings for the different groups of
commitments (0%, 0%-15%, 15%-50%, 50%+). Consumers choosing realistic goals achieve the
most substantial savings of 11% on average, indicating that their goals tend to be in line with
actual consumption. In the figure, we also plot the 95% confidence bounds for the estimated
mean savings for the group of consumers with realistic goals between 0% and 15%. The savings
for these households are statistically significantly different from zero for the entire post-adoption
time frame. By contrast, consumers choosing no goals save about 1.5% on average and those
choosing over-optimistic goals save on average only 1% savings, but neither of these types of
unrealistic goals results in statistically significant change in consumption behavior.18 Moreover,
the yearly average savings achieved by the over-optimistic and unrealistic consumers are driven by
their behavior in the first two months. These consumers quickly give up, realizing that they cannot
17Periods outside the event window are estimated at the same time as the bounds for the event window, i.e. the
indicator variable for periodk = m captures all periodst ≤ m and the indicator variable for periodk = m captures all
periodst ≥ m.
18In order to explore the behavioral differences between consumers with different goal levels, we also estimate a
model which measures the average post-adoption savings by group. We then conduct pairwise t-tests for the equality
of the post-adoption savings between groups. We reject the hypotheses of equal savings in all cases except for the
consumers with zero goals and those with overoptimistic goals.
18
achieve the projected savings. Together, these findings are consistent with the reference-dependent
model, which predicts an approximately inverse U-shaped relationship between goal choice and
savings. Those who set realistic goals achieve correspondingly increasing savings, while those
who are partially naive will fall short of self-set goals and actually save less as the savings goal
increases, due to diminishing sensitivity to relative losses. Since the goal is not payoff relevant, any
relationship, or lack thereof, between goal choice and post-adoption savings would be consistent
with the EU model.
Our reference-dependent, present-biased model predicts that, in addition to having higher post-
adoption consumption, present-biased consumers also achieve lower post-adoption savings than
those who are not. We restrict our attention to households who have chosen realistic goals, then
further divide such households into subgroups as a function of the different characteristics and
estimate the “event study” accounting for potential heterogeneity between the different subgroups.
We find that on average, the group of consumers that is tagged as more likely to be present-biased
saves less after adoption for variables for which we have sufficient observations to estimate the
model by characteristic. In particular, we find that dieters and those with high loan-to-value ratios
save significantly less than non-dieters and those with lower loan-to-value ratios, respectively.
For each of these variables, an analysis of households that includes both realistic and overly
optimistic goals reveals an even wider gap in savings between subgroups, though average savings
by both subgroups is unsurprisingly lower, since overly optimistic households save less on average
than realistic ones. In contrast, the EU model, which precludes self-control problems by assump-
tion, predicts no systematic relationship between indicators of demand for self-control and pre-
and post-adoption consumption. The higher pre-adoption consumption and differential savings re-
sponse to goals in the direction predicted by present bias suggest that our lifestyle variables are in
fact indicators of present bias, rather than simply indicators of consistent preferences. For exam-
ple, there is no parsimonious explanation for why those who simply prefer to lose weight and those
who are borrow heavily on homes, perhaps with higher expectations of future home values, would
both consume more electricity before adoption and be less responsive to goals after adoption than
those who don’t.
Feedback.In the CUB program, consumers receive monthly email feedback and reward points that
are not directly related to their chosen goals. Rather, they depend on the consumer’s consumption
relative to her weather-adjusted usage in the previous year, where the adjustment algorithm is not
known to the consumer. An analysis of the feedback and points awarded reveals that they are
poorly correlated with consumption. Over the program duration, all customers received between
60 and 100 points per month. The mean number of points awarded for consumers who selected
goals of 0%, 0-15%, 15-50% and 50%+ were 74, 81, 78 and 76 respectively, while the program-
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reported mean monthly savings over the same month a year earlier were 91, 115, 90 and 78 kWh
respectively. As we show in Section 4, actual savings by these groups was 1.5%, 11%, 1% and
0%, respectively. Thus, awarded points and email feedback are a very noisy and indirect signal of
true savings relative to selected goals.
This suggests that if consumers were motivated to save solely through reward points, they
would quickly give up after realizing the lack of correlation between their consumption and points
earned. That is, reward points don t act as a material incentive for consumers to achieve their
chosen goals. Therefore, the choice of goal level should be irrelevant to a standard expected-utility
maximizing consumer. Nonetheless, we find positive savings in the program that persistent among
a subset of consumers, and we observe a clear non-monotonic relationship between goal choice
and savings.
Moreover, since consumers received similar rewards irrespective of the actual savings achieved
or the goals chosen, consumers who sign up solely to earn reward points should quickly give up
saving once they realize this. While the initial saving and subsequent drop-off in savings among
those consumers who set 0% and overly ambitious savings goals is consistent with the EU model,
the persistent and substantial savings among those who set realistic goals indicates that pure points-
seeking is not a sufficient explanation for adoption and post-adoption behavior.
In sum, realistic goals imply persistently higher post-adoption savings than other goal levels
despite ineffectual material incentives in the form of reward points. Indicators of demand for com-
mitment predict higher pre-adoption and post-adoption consumption, as well as overly-optimistic
goal choices, relative to their absence. Taken together, this evidence is consistent with the predic-
tions of the behavioral model but cannot be easily reconciled with the expected utility model.
Alternative Mechanisms. Because the CUB program website includes reward points, personal
goal-setting and energy-saving tips, the exact mechanism through with post-adoption savings oc-
curs cannot be conclusively identified here. However, the observed pattern of post-adoption be-
havior is highly suggestive that information and reward points are not the sole drivers of savings
behavior.
Table 4 summarizes our empirical findings and model predictions. We compare our findings
for the predictions of the behavioral model with those of a standard EU model (described previ-
ously). We then consider several variants of the EU model, namely information-seeking, goals as
indicators of preferences, and goals as indicators of expectations.
While we argue that behavior is driven by reference-dependent preferences, an alternative ex-
planation is that non-binding personal goals are irrelevant to consumers, and that they are expected
utility (EU) maximizers who sign up because they may want to reduce their electricity bills but
have uncertainty about how to save effectively, which the energy-saving tips clarify. Thus, they
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have no self-control problem and their goal choice is irrelevant for behavior. However, the evidence
from the CUB program indicates that at least some proportion of consumers do not satisfy these
predictions. First, consumers who exhibit demand for commitment in other domains (i.e., dieters
or risky borrowers) are more likely to sign up than those who do not, and save significantly less
than those who do not after signing up. Second, the relationship between self-set goals and savings
behavior is not random. Moreover, at the action selection stage, all consumers are exposed to the
full array of energy-saving tips, of varying investment cost and efficiency impact,beforethey select
non-binding goals. Thus, it is not the case that consumers with higher goal levels are exposed to
actions that are more difficult or costly to implement than those with lower goal levels. Consumers
who select over-optimistic goals tend to select more actions that entail larger investments, which
is unsurprising since these would generate the largest savings if actually implemented. However,
there is no significant difference in the selection of low-cost behavioral actions across consumers
with different goal levels. The degree of goal ambition is driven by the number of actions, rather
than the type selected.
Another explanation is that consumers are EU maximizers who are information-seeking and
interested in reward points, but their self-selected goals are reflective of underlying preferences,
rather than random choices. But to explain the observed relationship between goals and consump-
tion, this implies that those who set 0-15% savings goals wanted to save this amount (or earn the
corresponding number of points), yet those who set above 15% savings goals actually wanted to
savelessthan the 0-15% group (or earn fewer points). We find this quite unconvincing. If goals re-
flect underlying preferences, it is much more plausible that those who set less ambitious goals wish
to save less, or are less motivated by points, than those who set more ambitious goals, who wish
to save more or are more motivated by points. However, the non-monotonic relationship between
goal level and savings behavior—in particular, that those who set goals above 15% actually save
less than those who set goals under 15%, and yet those who set exactly 0% goalsals save less
than those who set positive but realistic goals—belies this, and is instead predicted by the model
of reference-dependent preferences.
A third potential explanation is that those consumers who are the most responsive to goals are
those who select realistic goals. That is, consumers who are most responsive to goals also have
the most well-calibrated expectations, generating the non-monotonic relationship between goals
and savings. We cannot necessarily rule out this explanation, which makes the same prediction
as the assumption of diminishing sensitivity in the comparison utility function. Nonetheless, the
fact that a group of consumers is (persistently) responding to non-binding goals at all still belies
an expected utility-based model, which predicts that goals should have no effect, and is consistent
with reference dependence, with or without diminishing sensitivity.
Alternatively, perhaps consumers are responding just to energy saving tips and not to goals, and
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those who respond most to energy-saving tips happen to set realistic goals. That is, people who
respond to information also have the most well-calibrated expectations, while those who don’t
respond to information happen to be either optimistic or pessimistic about future behavior. But it
is unclear why responsiveness to information would be systemically correlated with miscalibrated
expectations. Moreover, if very low initial goals reflect low expectations about the effectiveness
of tips, then exceeding such expectations should lead to persistent savings among those with low
initial goals. This explanation is consistent with the lack of persistence among those who set
unreasonably optimistic goals, but cannot explain the lack of persistence among those who set
very low goals.
The CUB program also provided consumers with information on the “ranking” of their com-
munity in terms of savings relative to other communities. As we mentioned before, we do not
believe that this aspect of the program had a confounding effect. Evidence from the activity on the
website shows that this feature of the program was the least utilized and rarely looked at.
In the Appendix, we extend our model to allow for implementation costs. The theoretical
insights remain qualitatively very similar. Empirically, it is very challenging to consider ways of
quantifying the costs to the consumer of implementing a specific savings plan, since many of the
chosen actions are financially costless but may entail unobservable inconvenience or time costs.
A team of C3 engineers created an estimated score of the cost to the user of implementing each
action to supplement the observed financial cost. While this measure is clearly very noisy, it may
still be informative. A careful analysis of this data does not support implementation costs as an
explanation of the observed savings patterns in the data. In particular, it does not support the idea
that households choosing more difficult actions are less likely to save or to save persistently.
Our analysis addresses a leading explanation in the existing environmental literature on energy
conservation (e.g. Kotchen and Moore (2007)), that individuals are driven by altruistic concerns
for the environment or social well-being, which is adversely affected by environmental factors.
While this is entirely consistent with a desire to consume less electricity (as we acknowledged
in describing and interpreting the model), altruism is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain
why consumers would opt into the goal-setting program in the first place. If they were altruistic
and time-consistent, they would have no difficulty implementing plans to consume less electricity.
Thus, the only appeal of the program to such time-consistent altruists would be its informational
value or reward points, if they are uncertain about how to save electricity and view the program
as a source of information or if they want to earn points. However, we have already argued that
neither of these motivations is likely to be sufficient to explain the results.
The evidence from the CUB program corroborates with the theory that a measurable, non-
trivial proportion of consumers 1) have a tendency to overconsume electricity relative to their ex-
ante preference, and 2) possess reference-dependent preferences, where the goal acts as a reference
22
point and is determined by expectations. These findings are quite difficult to reconcile with stan-
dard EU preferences, particularly seeking reward points, seeking information, or some selection
effects. In our view, the most parsimonious explanation is that individuals seek the goal-setting pro-
gram because they are aware that they have a tendency to overconsume due to present-biasedness.
Because they are reference-dependent, they are aware that they will respond to even non-binding
goals, and attenuate their consumption.
5 Conclusion
In recent years, major utility companies around the country have introduced energy conservation
programs that rely on behavioral nudges to incentivize consumers to reduce energy consumption.
One of the mechanisms employed is to encourage consumers to choose a personal energy conser-
vation goal and provide them with the informational tools required for monitoring and achieving
their goal. This paper provides insights into the popularity of such programs and the likely energy
conservation response.
We develop a theory of consumer demand for energy conservation, in which consumers have
present-biased preferences, which lead them to overconsume, and reference dependent preferences,
where goals influence behavior by serving as reference points. We find evidence, based on the em-
pirical analysis of an energy conservation program in Northern Illinois, that is broadly consistent
with this theory, suggesting that goal setting can be an effective behavioral nudge for reducing
residential electricity consumption. While on average consumers save 4%, savings are very het-
erogeneous. Consumers who set realistic goals persistently achieve substantially higher savings
than those who do not. We consider and do not find support for several alternative explanations
for the adoption decision and post-adoption behavior, including points-seeking and information-
seeking. Thus, the evidence suggests that interest in energy-saving programs is driven by con-
sumers’ recognition of their present bias, and that goal setting can be quite effective at reducing
energy consumption when goals are achievable.
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Figure 1: Estimated percent savings from program adoption in event time.
Month 0 denotes the month before sign up. 95% confidence bounds are plotted around the mean estimates.
Figure 2: Heterogeneity in electricity savings after program adoption in relation to the chosen goal.
Shaded area corresponds to the 95% confidence bounds for the estimated mean savings of the 0%-15% goals group.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In the second stage, the goalr is taken as given by the consumer. Assuming an interior solution,
the consumer’s optimal consumption given a goal,(x∗ y∗), satisfies the first order condition when






(y∗))− [ f ′(r −x∗)+g′(x0−x
∗)]−βδc′(x∗) = 0. (5.6)
If the consumer does not sign up for the program, then her optimal consumption(x̃, ỹ) satisfies the






(ỹ))−βδc′(x̃) = 0. (5.7)




































< 0 if β > 0
0 if β = 0.
(5.10)
Note that∂x∂r is positive whenr > x and negative whenr < x, due to diminishing sensitivity to gains
and losses.
Proof of Proposition 2
If the consumer is time-consistent or naive (β̂ = 1), she only signs up if
βδ[V(x∗(β̂),y∗(β̂)|r = x∗(β̂))−V(x̃(β̂), ỹ(β̂))]− ε ≥ 0.
Whenβ̂ = 1, then ˜x(1) maximizesu(x,y)−δc(x) so
u(x∗(1),y∗(1))−δc(x∗(1)) < u(x̃(1), ỹ(1))−δc(x̃(1)).
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Thus, she will only sign up if
g(x0−x
∗(1)) ≥ [u(x̃(1), ỹ(1))−δc(x̃(1))]− [u(x∗(1),y∗(1))−δc(x∗(1))]+ ε, (5.11)
where the right-hand side is strictly positive. If Equation (5.11) is not satisfied, then a consumer
with β̂ = 1 does not sign up for the program.
Suppose that Equation (5.11) is not satisfied, and that the consumer is aware of a self-control
problem (β < 1). Since∂x
∗
∂β̂
< 1, theng(x0−x∗(1)) > g(x0−x∗(β̂)), so rewards are less attractive
whenβ̂ < 1 (because the consumer anticipates earning fewer rewards due to her tendency to over-
consume). Thus, the consumer’s motivation for sign-up is driven by the need for self-control when
β̂ < 1.
Implementation Costs
Suppose that the consumer also incurs a cost of implementing goals that result in reductions in
energy usage relative to not signing up. Many of the suggested actions for saving energy, such as
installing CFLs into lighting fixtures or regularly unplugging appliances after use, require addi-
tional effort or inconvenience to implement them. Due to diminishing marginal returns, the cost of
saving energy is increasing and convex. The functionh(x̃−x) describes the cost of implementing
energy-saving measures, where ˜x is the consumer’s energy consumption in the absence of program
sign-up:





> 0 if x̃≥ x






> 0 if x̃ > x






> 0 if x̃ > x
= 0 if x̃ < x.
(5.15)
We do not modelh(∙) as a direct function of the goalr, since the consumer would not incur
any additional implementation cost if she were to set an unambitious goal that she would exceed
without any additional effort (e.g., ifr > x̃ > x). Rather, implementation costs only are incurred
when the agent decides to use less electricity than she would have had she not signed up for the
program. The goal indirectly affects implementation costs through its effect on the consumer’s
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consumption decision.
Thus, the consumer’s problem in the second stage is
max
x,y
u(x,y)+1signup[ f (r −x)+g(x0−x)−h(x̃−x)]−βδc(x) subject tom≥ px+y, (5.16)
where 1signup= 1 if the consumer signs up for the program and is zero otherwise. When deciding
whether to sign up for the program, she takes into account her consumption behavior in response
to the goal, her anticipated costs of implementing them, and the reward points she would earn.
With the inclusion of the goal implementation cost, the consumer’s energy consumption in the
absence of program sign-up,(x̃, ỹ), is still described by Equation (5.7). Her optimal consumption






(y∗))− [ f ′(r −x∗)+g′(x0−x
∗)−h′(x̃−x∗)]−βδc′(x∗) = 0, (5.17)
px∗ +y∗ = m. (5.18)
The consumer would never sign up for the program if the cost of goal implementation were so high
that she would end up using more electricity after sign-up. Thus,f ′(r −x∗)+g′(x0−x∗)−h′(x̃−
x∗) ≥ 0 andx∗ ≤ x̃. We now re-derive the main propositions for the model with implementation
costs.
Proof that x∗ ≤ x̃ Suppose thatx∗ > x̃, or equivalently that ˜x− x∗ < 0. Comparing Equations
(5.7) and (5.6),x∗ > x̃ only if f ′(r − x∗) + g′(x0− x∗)− h′(x̃− x∗) < 0. But if x̃− x∗ < 0, then
h′(x̃−x∗) = 0. Sincef ′(r −x∗) > 0 andg′(x0−x∗)≥ 0, then it must be thatx∗ ≤ x̃ from Equations
(5.7) and (5.6). Thus,x∗ ≤ x̃.
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< 0 if β > 0















< 0 if β > 0
0 if β = 0.
(5.23)
Note that∂x∂r is positive whenr > x and negative whenr < x, due to diminishing sensitivity to gains
and losses.
Proof of Proposition 2: If the consumer is time-consistent or naive (β̂ = 1), she only signs up
if
βδ[V(x∗(β̂),y∗(β̂)|r = x∗(β̂))−V(x̃(β̂), ỹ(β̂))]− ε ≥ 0.
Whenβ̂ = 1, then ˜x(1) maximizesu(x,y)−δc(x) so
u(x∗(1),y∗(1))−δc(x∗(1)) < u(x̃(1), ỹ(1))−δc(x̃(1)).
Thus, she will only sign up if
g(x0−x
∗(1)) ≥ [u(x̃(1), ỹ(1))−δc(x̃(1))]− [u(x∗(1),y∗(1))−δc(x∗(1))]+h(x̃(1)−x∗(1))+ ε,
(5.24)
where the right-hand side is strictly positive. If Equation (5.11) is not satisfied, then a consumer
with β̂ = 1 does not sign up for the program.
Suppose that Equation (5.24) is not satisfied, and that the consumer is aware of a self-control
problem (β < 1). Since∂x
∗
∂β̂
< 1, theng(x0−x∗(1)) > g(x0−x∗(β̂)), so rewards are less attractive
whenβ̂ < 1 (because the consumer anticipates earning fewer rewards due to her tendency to over-
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consume). Thus, the consumer’s motivation for sign-up is driven by the need for self-control when
β̂ < 1.
Robustness of Savings Behavior Using Matching
Our estimate of the extent to which households save as a result of this program may depend on the
extent to which individuals with different characteristics opt into the program at different points in
time. To evaluate the robustness of these savings estimates, we use propensity score matching to
account for the potentially varying demographics of the adopters over time as they select into the
program. We follow the method for computing the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
introduced in Sianesi (2004), by comparing those individuals who adopt at timewith those who
have not adopted up until(they adopt in future periods), while correcting for discrepancies in
observables.
First, we determine the treatment and control groups. Each periodu has its own treatment and
control group. The treatment is starting the program in monthu. The control group at timeu is
composed of all those that have not joined the program yet. Formally, letDit be equal to 1 if the
individual i had join the program by periodt. Then the treatment and the control groups at time u,
Tu andCu respectively, are defined as follows:
i ∈ Tu ⇔ Diu = 1 & Dit = 0 ∀t < u
i ∈Cu ⇔ Dit = 0 ∀t ≤ u.
In our case, we consider 19 months (June 2010-December 2011) when the individuals could
have adopted, i.e.u = 1,2, ...,19. Hence, we have 19 control and treatment groups.
Second, for each periodu we are interested in obtaining the average impact at timein log
electricity usage, for those adopting the program in theiruth month,4ut . 4
u






(u) = 1); t ≥ u. (5.25)
Each4ut is estimated using propensity score matching. For each of the 19 treatment and
control groups, we perform propensity score matching to obtain the ATT on log usage at timet.
We match on the available demographics and on pre-adoption monthly usage, and also employ
several varieties of the nearest neighbor method for matching.
Finally, we are interested in the synthetic overview of adoption’s effect at timet. That is, we
want to know the effect on electricity usage at periodt after adoption, independently of when the
individual adopted. Hence, we compute the average4ut , by weighting the different ATT’s by the
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proportion of treated that join in periodu:
EU(4
u




t |D(u) = 1)×P(D
(u) = 1|D = 1), (5.26)
whereP(D(u) = 1|D = 1) is estimated as the number of individuals that joined in periodu over
the total individuals that joined up to period t. We compute the standard errors by 500 bootstrap
repetitions.
For presentational simplicity, we summarize the estimation results in Table 3 by reporting the
average of the estimated savings over the post-adoption period (instead of reporting period by
period estimates). Model (I) estimates the difference-in-differences equation (Equation 4.5) using
one post-adoption indicator. The average estimated post-adoption savings for consumers who opt
in is 4.4%. The different matching approaches produce estimates ranging from 2.9% to 4.4%.19
19Note that the standard errors increase as a result of the matching algorithm utilizing only a small subset of the
observations at each step. This is unavoidable given the limited data available.
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